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The primary objective of this thesis was to analyze the
suitability for use of the Award Fee Types of Contracts in the
Israeli Ministry of Defense. The researcher used the Navy's
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair award fee
monitoring organization as a sample for comparison with the
Israeli Ministry of Defense organization. The purpose for
this comparison was to determine if there was an organization
structure barrier that would prevent implementation of the
Award Fee Types of Contracts. Other barriers were identified
and discussed through the use of a written survey conducted
with key personnel within the Israeli Ministry of Defense. A
guide was developed for use when implementing the Award Fee
Types of Contracts.
The analysis revealed that there were no barriers that
could not be overcome and that the benefits to be gained by
incorporating the Award Fee Types of Contracts far outweigh
any impediments. It was recommended that the Israeli Ministry
of Defense consider incorporating these types of contracts
into their procurement regulations after evaluating the
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A. AREA OF RESEARCH
This thesis will examine the suitability of the Award Fee
types of contracts for use by the Israeli Ministry of Defense
(MOD) . Currently, the Israeli MOD utilizes only Fixed Price,
Cost and Incentive type contracts. Incorporating the Award
Fee types of contracts into the Israeli MOD regulations could
benefit Israel. This thesis will explore the implications
associated with the use of the Award Fee concept by the
Israeli MOD.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Primary research question is as follows:
Should the Award Fee types of contracts be used in
satisfying the requirements of the Israeli Ministry of
Defense?
The subsidiary research questions are as follows:
1. What are the advantages and disadvantages associated
with the use of Award Fee type contracts?
2. What are the differences between the acquisition
organization of the DoD as characterized by the Navy
organization and the Ministry of Defense, with respect
to administration of Award Fee contracts?
3
.
What is the best method to implement Award Fee contracts
in the Ministry of Defense?
4. Under which conditions will it be better to use Fixed
Price Award Fee type contracts versus Cost Plus Award
Fee type contracts?
C. SCOPE OF THE THESIS
This thesis will thoroughly analyze the Award Fee types of
contracts and investigate their potential use by the Israeli
MOD. Through this research, a guide will be developed that
can be used by the Israeli MOD to implement the Award Fee
types of contracts in their procurement regulations.
D. METHODOLOGY
The methodology that will be used to complete the thesis
will combine the following:
A comprehensive literature review will be conducted to
better understand the conditions required for use of all types
of contracts in the Department of Defense regulations and
their advantages and disadvantages. Personal interviews were
conducted with appropriate Department of Defense personnel who
use Award Fee contracts to obtain their opinions and insights.
Personal interviews with Israeli MOD representatives, and
a short questionnaire to members of the Israeli MOD purchasing
department were conducted to identify barriers and potential
impediments that would affect the implementation of the Award
Fee types of contracts in the Israeli MOD acquisition process.
E. ASSUMPTIONS
The first assumption used in this thesis is that the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and its supplements
pertaining to the use and administration of Award Fee types of
contracts provide an appropriate model for use by the Israeli
MOD. Secondly, it is assumed that the Navy's Award Fee
administration organization used in the Supervisor of
Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair is an efficient and
effective organization for use as a sample.
F. ORGANIZATION
In Chapter II of this thesis, the reader will be
introduced to the types of contracts being used by the Israeli
Ministry of Defense. The chapter will also identify the
appropriate conditions for use of each contract type.
Chapter III will outline the concept of the Award Fee type
of contract and its use in the DoD. The chapter discussion
will include the principles and procedures for awarding and
administering Award Fee types of contracts.
Chapter IV will compare the organizational structure of
the U.S. Navy's Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and
Repair with the Israeli MOD. The objective of this chapter is
to determine if there are any organizational structural
impediments to the implementation of the Award Fee types of
contracts into the Israeli MOD regulations.
Chapter V will identify and discuss barriers to
implementation of the Award Fee types of contracts in the
Israeli MOD. A questionnaire was sent to the Economists and
Section Heads in the Department of Procurement and Production
within the Israeli MOD to solicit their concerns and identify
those barriers.
Chapter VI will present a general guide that can be used
for implementing Award Fee contracts in the Israeli MOD.
Chapter VII will summarize the research, provide
conclusions and make recommendations.
II. BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the types of
contracts that exist in the Israeli Ministry of Defense (MOD)
regulation. Six contract types were developed to support the
variety of items and services purchased. The type of contract
to be used is chosen according to the complexity of the
requirements, the risk involved and the level of unknown costs
associated with the pricing of the contract.
Each contract type contains an automatic economic price
adjustment clause. The automatic economic price adjustment is
effected through the use of a formula which is built into each
contract. It calculates the contract price changes between
the time of the price agreement to the payment date. The
formula includes official indexes which will be used to
calculate the economic adjustment and also identifies the
effective interval of time to compare the indexes. Because
the formula is incorporated in the contract, no additional
negotiations between the parties on the economic price
adjustment takes place after the award of the contract. This
allows the contractor to receive compensation for the
influence of inflation and also reduces the contractor's risks
associated with unknown economic conditions. The words
"price" or "cost" as used in this thesis are defined as the
price or cost at the time the contract price is agreed upon
(also called "base-price" or "base-cost")
.
There are basically two major types of contracts in use by
the Israeli MOD, Fixed Price and Cost.
1. Fixed Price Contracts
Fixed Price contracts are contracts in which the price
includes the contractor's costs and profit, which are usually
negotiated before the contract is awarded. After award,
contract payment does not depend on the actual costs
experienced by the contractor during performance. Instead,
the contractor will be paid only the negotiated contract
price.
2 . Cost Contracts
Cost contracts are contracts in which the final
contract price is not determined until the end of the
contract. In these contracts, the Government compensates the
contractor for all allowable costs during the fulfillment of
the contract plus a negotiated fee.
The following description and discussion of the types
of contracts are outlined according to the associated contract
risk to the Government. The contracts range from Firm-Fixed
Price (minimum risk) to Time and Materials (maximum risk)
.
The descriptions are taken from the Israeli MOD regulations
40.06 Appendix A.
The types of contracts used in the Israeli MOD
regulations are comparable to the corresponding types of
contracts used in the United States Department of Defense.
Many of the advantages and disadvantages of these types of
contracts are based on the Type of Contract Summary , by the




This type of contract is the preferred type for use by the
Government. Upon agreement between the parties, the contract
price is fixed. This means that the price does not depend on
the contractor's cost of production, profit or loss. The
administrative burden upon the contracting parties under this
contract type is minimal. While the FFP contract is the
preferred type for the Government because all the risk is on
the contractor, it can only be used if the price was deemed
fair and reasonable by the Government.
The use of this contract type is appropriate for a
commercial item or service, a repetitive production item or
service, and if the price can be justified to be fair and
reasonable [Ref . 1] . The advantages and disadvantages of the
FFP contract are summarized below:
1. Advantages
a. It is the easiest and least costly type of
contract to administer because it is the contractor's
commitment to provide the item or service as specified in the
contract (price, specification and schedule) , and it is the
Government's commitment to make payment for the final product,
as agreed upon in advance.
b. The FFP contract encourages the contractor to be
efficient and to economize. It provides the most incentive to
the contractor to reduce costs. The contractor's actual
profit is increased if there is a positive difference between
expected costs and actual costs.
c. Maximum risk for profit or loss is borne by the
contractor because the parties agreed upon the price in
advance and unexpected costs will not be recovered by the
Government. As a result of this, the last advantage of the
FFP contract is that it:
d. Allows accurate obligation of funds at the outset.
2. Disadvantages
a. Under the FFP contract, the contractor has no
incentive to provide a better quality product than specified
in the contract.
b. Because the price is fixed, there is no recovery
by the Government if the market price falls or if costs are
reduced by the contractor.
c. There is a lack of flexibility in managing the FFP
contract. The price is fixed for a specific performance as
defined in the contract and any variation must be accomplished
by an appropriate change in the contract.
C. TEMPORARY PRICE WITH CEILING
This is a Fixed-Price type of contract used when the price
cannot be determined or agreed upon at the outset of work.
The parties agree to a temporary price ceiling at the time of
the award, and agree to negotiate a fixed price during
contract performance. Until the parties agree upon the final
fixed price, the temporary price substitutes as the FFP
ceiling for obligational purposes. The temporary price cannot
be greater than the contractor's proposal. The final fixed
price can be lower or equal to the temporary ceiling after
negotiations and agreement occur.
The Temporary Price with Ceiling is appropriate only when
most of the conditions for the FFP type of contract exist and
when the contract cannot be delayed until the pricing process
is completed, because there is a need for an urgent critical
item [Ref. 1].
1. Advantages and Disadvantages
The Temporary Price with Ceiling has the same
advantages and disadvantages as the FFP contract, with one
additional disadvantage. The contractor has no incentive to
reduce costs during the contract performance period before it
changes to an FFP contract. This occurs because the price
decision is made when the contractor is already in the
production process and the accumulated actual costs will be
included in the final price.
Because of its higher risk to the Government, the
Temporary Price with Ceiling type of contract is less
preferable than the FFP type of contract.
D. CEILING PRICE WITH INCENTIVE or FIXED PRICE INCENTIVE
(FPI)
The Ceiling Price with Incentive is a hybrid contract. It
functions in a similar manner to a Cost-Pius-Incentive-Fee
(CPIF) contract until the costs reach the ceiling price; at
that point it essentially becomes a FFP contract. This means
that when the contractor's costs are higher than the ceiling
price, the price of the contract is no longer based on the
cost, but on the negotiated ceiling price. This contract type
includes negotiated amount for: "expected costs", "expected
profit," "expected price," "share formula" and "ceiling
price"
.
"Expected price" is expected cost plus expected profit.
"Expected Cost" is the negotiated estimate of the cost to
perform the contract. "Expected profit" is negotiated before
the contract award based on the expected costs and the risks
involved in performing the contract.
The "ceiling price" is determined by the "expected price"
plus an additional amount of no more than 10% of the "expected
price". The "share formula" defines the ratio of sharing the
overrun or underrun, with respect to the "expected cost",
between the Israeli MOD and the contractor. The formula can
define different ratios for different deviations from the
10
"expected cost". The Government's share can be higher for
costs closer to expected cost and lower for costs farther from
the expected cost.
The decision on final price:
1. When the actual costs are below the "expected cost", the
final price will be actual costs plus "expected profit",
plus the contractor's share of the difference between
"expected costs" and actual costs. In this case the
final price will always be less than the "expected
price"
.
2. When the actual costs are above the "expected costs" but
below the "ceiling price", the final price will be
actual costs plus "expected profit", minus the
contractor's share of the difference between actual
costs and "expected cost" . This reduction should not
exceed the "expected profit" amount. The final price
must not be greater than the "ceiling price".
3. When the actual costs are above the "ceiling price", the
final price will be the "ceiling price".
It is appropriate to use this type of contract when the
price is difficult to justify but a general estimation of the
price can be made or there is a limit above which the item or
service is not worth the price [Ref . 1] . This type of
contract provides an incentive for the contractor to be
efficient and to reduce costs below the "expected costs"
amount by increasing the profit to the contractor when the
costs are reduced. When there is an expense overrun, the
Government shares the risk and cost with the contractor.
However, the FPI contract protects the Government from overrun
costs over the ceiling price.
11
are:
1. Advantages and Disadvantages
The Advantages and Disadvantages of the FPI contract
1. Advantages
a. Provide timely and positive incentive to the contractor
to control costs.
b. Can enable the Government to obtain material and/or
services at a lower cost than might otherwise, normally
be expected.
c. Contractor has full liability for all incurred costs
beyond the price ceiling.
d. Share formula may be varied to fit the specific
situation, commensurate with degree of confidence
parties have in range of possible cost of performance,
and variations above or below target cost ("expected
cost"). [Ref. 2: p. 9]
2. Disadvantages
a. Requires establishing realistic, target cost ("expected
costs") where there ia an equal probability of an
underrun or overrun.
b. Within limit of price ceiling, the Government shares
cost of overrun with contractor.
c. Unrealistic target price can invite reversing the goal
of the incentive provision, i.e., cost overrun may not
be reflective of lack of cost control by contractor, or
cost underrun reflective of outstanding cost control by
a contractor. [Ref. 2: p. 9]
E. COST-PLUS-INCENTIVE-FEE (CPIF)
This is a cost type contract which offers the contractor
an incentive to reduce costs by increasing the fee when actual
costs are kept below expected costs. The incentive is limited
because the contractor will be paid for all his allowable
costs and the size of the fee he can earn is limited. This
12
contract includes negotiated amount for: "expected costs",
"expected price", "expected fee", "minimum fee", "maximum fee"
and "share formula".
The "expected price" is the "expected cost" plus "expected
fee" (which is negotiated based on the expected costs and the
performance risk) . The "share formula" defines the ratio of
sharing the difference between "expected cost" and actual
cost, by the Government and the contractor. The formula can
define different ratios for different deviations of "expected
cost". The Government's share can be higher for those costs
closer to "expected cost" and lower for those costs farther
from the "expected cost".
The final contract price is determined in the following
manner:
1. When the actual costs are below the "expected cost", the
final price will be the sum of the actual costs plus
"expected fee" plus the contractor's share of the
difference between "expected costs" and actual costs.
The final fee ("expected fee" plus contractor share)
must not exceed the "maximum fee"
.
2. When the actual costs are higher than the "expected
costs", the final price will be the sum of the actual
costs plus "expected fee" minus the contractor's share
of the difference between actual costs and "expected
cost". The final fee ("expected fee" minus contractor
share) must be no less than the "minimum fee".
This type of contract is appropriate for circumstances in
which the costs of performance can be estimated. However,
there are many unknown elements which make it very risky (for




The CPIF is an incentive type of contract within the range
between the "maximum fee" and "minimum fee". Because the fee
increases when the contractor's costs are lower than the
"expected costs", the contractor is motivated to be more
efficient and to reduce costs. When the contractor's costs
are such that the fee will be higher than the "maximum fee" or
lower than the "minimum fee", the contract type, essentially
changes into a Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) contract. Under
this condition, the contractor is compensated for his costs,
but the fee is fixed. The fixed fee is either the "maximum
fee" or the "minimum fee", depending on the situation.
The advantages and disadvantages of the CPIF contract are:
1. Advantages
a. Encourages economical, efficient and effective
contractor performance when a cost-reimbursement type
contract is necessary.
b. Mutual benefit potential for Government and contractor.
[Ref. 2:p. 19]
2. Disadvantages
a. Costly auditing and administrative burden.
b. Contractor must have adequate accounting system for
timely and proper cost determination. [Ref. 2:p. 19]
F. COST-PLDS-FIXED-FEE (CPFF)
The Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee type contract is designed for
situations in which it is very difficult to reasonably
estimate of the costs. All the cost risk is on the Government
[Ref. 1]. The contract contains a budget limit which should
not be overrun. When the contractor's costs approach a
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certain level as defined in the contract, they must notify the
Government and obtain permission to continue. This is done
formally by increasing the contract budget ceiling. Other-
wise, work must stop when the costs to the Government have
reached the budget limit. The contractor is not bound to
complete contract performance once the budget limit is
reached. The only incentive for the contractor to reduce
costs is the fact that the fee is fixed and not related to the
actual costs. The contractor's profit is measured not only by
the amount of fee received, but also by the percentage of that
fee over costs. The percentage of fee will be greater as the
costs are reduced. Changes in the budget cost of the contract
must be coordinated with appropriate changes in the fixed fee.
The advantages and disadvantages of the CPFF type contract
are:
1. Advantages
May proceed with vague scope and indefinite specifications
[Ref. 2:p. 23].
2. Disadvantages
a. Provides minimum incentive to the contractor to control
costs.
b. Expensive to administer.
c. Essentially, profit w/o risk to contractor.
d. Contractor must have an adequate accounting system.
e. Least contractor responsibility for costs. [Ref. 2: p.
23]
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6. TIME AMD MATERIALS (T&M)
This type of contract is essentially a Cost type contract
in which the price per labor hour, the fee per labor hour, and
material percentage fee are negotiated in advance. The
contract payments are determined by actual hours expended in
the performance of the contract and by all material costs plus
a percentage of the material fee.
There is a budget limit in the contract which the
contractor must not exceed, but there is no contractor
obligation for a final product.
This is the least preferred type of contract; its use is
restricted to Research & Development, maintenance and
professional advice [Ref. 1] . The advantages and
disadvantages of a T&M contract are:
1. Advantages
The only advantage of this type of contract is that it
can be used in special situations which fit no other contract
type.
2. Disadvantages
a. Require appropriate surveillance by the Government
during performance to preclude inefficiency or waste by
contractor.
b. Danger of contractor running up time to increase profit.
c. Expensive to administer.
d. Contractor must have an adequate accounting system.
e. No positive profit incentive to control costs or to
manage labor force efficiently. [Ref. 2:p. 25]
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H. PROBLEMS IN THE ISRAELI PROCUREMENT PROCESS
Mr. Zvi Lavi, the former head of Economic Consult in the
Department Of Procurement and Production (DOPP) of the Israeli
MOD [Ref. 3], said that even though these contract types
include incentives for the contractor to increase efficiency
and reduce cost, none of them provide an incentive for better
performance than what is required by the specifications of the
contract. These specifications are designed as minimum
requirements for the contract. There are times when better
performance or increased management attention to specific
areas is desirable. Therefore, it may be advantageous for the
Government to pay a higher contract price for better
performance in these areas. He also said that, given the
types of contracts that exist in Israel today, the Government
has no contractual means of controlling and influencing the
contractor's goals and objectives during the performance of
the contract. Elements, such as development of a better
quality assurance system, or accounting of costs for future
purchases, cannot be identified as conditions of acceptance
and cannot be controlled or influenced by the Government.
The United States literature discusses the advantages and
disadvantages of the types of contracts which exist in the
Israeli MOD regulation. These types, which can be divided
into three categories: Fixed Price, Cost, and Incentive
Contracts, are only some of the types of contracts that exist
in the DOD regulations. Even though the Israeli MOD'S
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existing types of contracts fulfill the requirements for the
purchasing process, there continues to be a need for more
flexibility by top managers to control and administer the
contract.
In his study, Jerry Y. Brown summarizes the limitation of
the types of contracts discussed in this chapter and justifies
the need for a new type of contract:
The CPFF type did not create an incentive for effective
cost control and management, and the FFP contract imposed
an inordinate risk on the contractor for programs lacking
highly definitized specifications and employing state-of-
the-art technology . . . Incentive contracting, to some
degree, solved the CPFF-FFP dilemma, but a void still
remained. There were areas that were not subject to
objective measurement and hence was no method for applying
incentives. [Ref. 4:p. 3]
Mr. Brown also reviewed the Award Fee contract in his
study as the type of contract that can fill the contracting
void.
I . SUMMARY
This chapter provided background on the types of contracts
used by the Israeli Ministry of Defense when purchasing
supplies and services. The discussion was an English transla-
tion of the Israeli Ministry of Defense's procurement regula-
tions. This chapter also developed the reasons why there is
potential benefit to be received by the Israeli MOD if they
adopted the Award Fee types of contracts and added them to
their regulations.
The next chapter will outline the concept of the Award fee
type of contract as a contract type that can fill the
18
contracting void. The discussion will include principles and
procedures for awarding and administrating Award Fee type of
contract as it is used in the DoD.
19
III. THE AWARD FEE CONCEPT AMD ITS USE IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
A. AWARD FEE CONTRACT CONCEPT
The Award Fee concept is used in incentive type contracts,
in an effort to motivate contractors to improve their perfor-
mance in specific categories beyond the minimum requirements
outlined in the contract. These categories are selected by
the Government for special emphasis by the contractor. There
is a separate pool of money that is designated for award to
the contractor for evaluated performance in these specified
categories. Based on a subjective evaluation process, the
Government can withhold a portion of the award fee due to less
than excellent performance.
The Award Fee concept can be used with both fixed-price
and cost-type contracts.
The Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) contract:
. . . (i)s a cost-reimbursement contract that provides a
fee consisting of (1) a base amount fixed at inception of
the contract and (2) an award amount that the contractor
may earn in whole or in part during performance and that
is sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in such
areas as quality, timeliness, technical ingenuity, and
cost-effective management. [Ref. 5]
The Fixed-Price-Award-Fee (FPAF) contract is not an
official type of contract (it is not specified in the FAR),
but it is used as a hybrid contract. The award fee portion is
used in the same manner as the Cost Plus Award Fee contract.
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1. Objectives of the Award Fee Contract
Award Fee contracts are designed to provide a
monetary incentive to the contractor for better than the
minimum acceptable performance in specifically chosen areas.
The usual criteria includes, but is not limited to:
management, performance, quality of work, and cost (cost is
not one of the criteria in FPAF) . Each criterion must be
specifically addressed in the contract along with the method
for its evaluation.
The decision, with respect to amount of the award fee
given to the contractor, is subjective and cannot be disputed
under the rules of this contract type.
An important element of the Award Fee concept is the
flexibility it provides the Government to unilaterally change
the emphasis of the criteria for which the award fee is given.
It also improves the communications between the
Government and the contractor by providing an effective
feedback mechanism. As Brown states in his paper:
The nature of the Award Fee concept allows the government
to provide formalized periodic feedback to the contractor
on how he is progressing. It also provides the government
with an opportunity to make periodic thorough evaluations
of progress, and cause corrective action in areas under
evaluation if performance is not as expected. [Ref. 4: p.
7]
2. Award-Fee Plan
Every Award Fee contract must include an Award Fee
plan which specifies:
a. The functional areas to evaluate,
21
b. The criteria and weighted formula to calculate the
amount of the award-fee,
c. A list of the members of the Award Review Board (ARB)
,
and
d. The Award Fee Determination Official (AFDO)
.
The dollar amount of the total award-fee pool and the
dollar amount designated for each evaluation period is
outlined in the Award Fee Plan. The plan addresses whether or
not the portion of the award fee withheld by the Government
for an evaluation period will be rolled-over into the next
evaluation period. The Award Fee Plan will also provide for
reclama procedures by the contractor and defines the time
limits for each step of the evaluation along with the
procedures for approval and payment.
3. Function and Process in the Administration of Award
Fee Type Contract
The following is a list of functions required in the
administration of award fee contracts as described in the




Convening the performance evaluation board
Computing the award fee
Role of the fee determining official
Paying the contractor
Providing feedback to the contractor [Ref. 6: p. 45]
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a. Monitoring Performance
The success of the entire Award Fee process is
based on the proper monitoring of the contractor's
performance. This is done by the performance monitoring
activity. The performance monitoring must begin from the
first day of the evaluation period and continue constantly
throughout the entire evaluation period, culminating with a
written evaluation of the contractor's performance.
b. Communicating with the Contractor
Part of the function of the performance monitoring
activity is to communicate with the contractor, by maintaining
day-to-day contact, monitoring performance, discussing
performance problems and obtaining all necessary information
from the contractor.
c. Convening the Performance Evaluation Board
The members of the ARB meet in order to receive
and evaluate reports from the performance monitoring
activities and to decide on the amount of the award fee. The
meeting must be convened promptly at the end of the evaluation
period to prevent delays in approval of the award fee. The
members of the ARB read all the reports, question and listen
to all explanations from representatives of the functional
organization regarding the contractor's performance. Based on
this information, and on the contractor's comments, they must
evaluate and grade the contractor's performance, and compute
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the score for the specific evaluation period according to the
formula in the contract.
This process is very detailed and must be well
documented. Each category of performance is divided into
subcategories. The subcategories are evaluated and separate
numerical scores assigned. The category score is a weighted
average of the subcategory scores. Finally the score for the
evaluation period is the weighted average of the category
scores.
d. Computing the Award Fee
The amount of the award fee is computed by
multiplying the total score (given in percentage form) , by the
dollars available in the Award Fee pool.
e. Role of the Award Fee Determining Official
(AFDO)
The AFDO, after receiving the ARB recommendation
with their rationale, is responsible for the final decision.
The AFDO authorizes payment and signs the ARB's letter to the
contractor informing him of the decision.
f. Paying the Contractor
The procedure for paying the award fee should be
separated from the procedure used to pay the contractor under
the basic contract. The award-fee should be paid immediately
after the decision has been made, in order to demonstrate the
government's appreciation for the contractor's efforts and to
provide an incentive to the contractor to continue his
management efforts in the identified areas.
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Special arrangements are made to achieve prompt
payment: the letter signed by the AFDO is hand carried
directly to the Accounting and Finance Activity for immediate
issuance of the check to the contractor (it can be attached to
the contractor's invoice, depending on the contract's terms).
g. Providing Feedback to the Contractor
In order to achieve the objective of satisfying
the customer, the contractor must be knowledgeable of his own
weaknesses and strengths. He must fully understand the Award
Fee requirements. A formal meeting with the contractor at the
end of every evaluation period provides the contractor with
constructive feedback on his efforts and progress. Since the
contractor has no right to appeal the amount of the award fee,
it is very important to explain the rationale for the award
Fee received.
B. ADMINISTRATION OF AWARD FEE CONTRACTS
The administration of Award Fee contracts plays a very
important role towards achieving the objectives of this type
of contract.
Because the performance evaluation of the contractor's
work is subjective, the contractor must believe and trust that
they are being treated fairly by the Government. The
evaluation must be conducted in a fair and impartial manner.
Otherwise, the contractor may perform as if there is no
incentive to do well.
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The administration of the award fee contract must be
efficient in order to compensate for the additional effort
required by the contract. To be worthwhile, the benefit from
the award-fee portion must exceed the additional cost of
administrating it.
1. Organization of Award-Fee Administration
The administration of the award-fee contract should be
organized on three basic levels:
Performance monitoring activities,
Award Review Board (ARB)
,
Award Fee Determination Official (AFDO)
.
Figure 1 is a flow diagram of the typical organization







































Business Monitors Technical Monitors
Performance monitoring activity
Figure 1
CPAF Information Flow Chart
[Ref. 7:p. 50]
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a. Performance Monitoring Activities
This is the lowest level in the award-fee
organization. The day-to-day monitoring of the contractor's
performance is carried out by specialists on the Adminis-
trative Contracting Officer (ACO) or Contracting Officer
Representative (COR) staff who survey the contractor's
performance within their specialty area. These specialists
must be familiar with the performance criteria listed in the
award-fee plan in order to monitor the contractor's perfor-
mance. They must document on a periodic report, their
observations of the contractor's performance. They rank the
performance according to the award-fee plan criteria and
forward it to the ARB.
b. Award Review Board (ARB)
The Award Review Board (ARB) is also called the
Performance Evaluation Board (PEB) . The voting members of the
ARB are normally the heads of the organizations which directly
benefit from the contract. The advisors are typically the
heads of the functional organization that monitors the
contractor's performance.
At the end of each evaluation period, the ARB
prepares a written recommendation on the amount of award-fee
to be given to the contractor and forwards the recommendation
to the AFDO for final approval.
The members of the ARB must become familiar with
the contract reguirements and their organization's level of
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satisfaction regarding the contractor's performance. Based on
their experience and the reports they receive from the
performance monitoring activity, the ARB members recommend the
amount of award-fee to be paid to the contractor.
They also recommend necessary changes in the
award-fee plan to the AFDO (such as changes in the weighted
factors) based on the contractor's performance in the last
evaluation period and based on the area of desired emphasis
for the next period.
The contractor can send a representative to the
ARB proceedings even though he has no voting rights on the
board. The ARB decision must be:
With sufficient supporting documentation to cause a
reaction at the contractor's corporate level. The award-
fee earned is only the result of the Board's action in
determining rewards while the rationale serves as a
springboard for motivating the contractor to improve
efficient and economical performance. [Ref. 8:p. 9]
c. Award Fee Determination Official (AFDO)
This is the highest level in the organization of
the award-fee administration. This official should be the
senior ranking official who
influence [s] the contractor to commit its top
management ... to have an individual who has direct
interest in the quality of the service, but is far enough
removed from observing daily performance, to allow for a
fair fee determination based on recommendation of the
Performance Evaluation Board. [Ref. 6: p. 57]
The AFDO determines the amount of the award-fee
and authorizes the Accounting and Finance Activity to pay it.
The AFDO also approves any changes in the award-fee plan and
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is responsible for giving the contractor feedback on strengths
and weaknesses during the evaluation period.
C. CHANGES IN THE BASIC CONTRACT
The amount of Award Fee is linked to the price of the
contract. If it is too high, the contractor might concentrate
only on the award-fee requirements instead of the contract
requirements. If it is too low, the contractor may not see it
as an incentive.
Every significant change in the total amount of the basic
contract must be accompanied by an appropriate change in the
amount of the award-fee.
D. CONDITIONS FOR USE OF AWARD FEE CONTRACTS
The general conditions for the use of the Award Fee method
of acquisition, as Mr. Hurt explains them, are:
1. When the government's principal managers determine that
uncertainties exist which preclude rigorous specifica-
tions of contract performance parameters or price,




When the magnitude of the contracted work or potential
benefit to the government is sufficient to justify the
administrative costs of the Award Fee procedure. [Ref
.
9:p. 49]
The decision to use each of the Award Fee types of
contract (Fixed Price or Cost) should be based on the
following factors:
1. FPAF
a. Fixed Price type of contract is found appropriate for
use.
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b. Flexibility in managing the contract is needed and is
not achieved under any other kind of incentive Fixed
Price contract.
In addition to these, the Base-Level Award Fee Guide
identified the following conditions:
c. High Visibility Service (Mission Essential)
d. High Dollar Value Service (at least $200k annually)
e. A contract Service with a History of performance
problems. [Ref. 6: p. 4]
2. CPAF
a. A cost-reimbursement type contract is found necessary.
The use of a cost-reimbursement contract is almost
always associated with performance requirements that are
difficult to shape and articulate in detail.
b. Uncertainty grounded in unknowns provide little
assurance that a higher-risk contract type would favor
either the government or the contractor.
c. The work to be performed is such that specific quantita-
tive or objective measurement may not be feasible, and
it extends over a sufficient period of time for the
award fee features to be used effectively.
d. Contractor performance involves multiple tasks or
functions within a broad range or scope of work.
e. Any additional administrative effort and cost required




Flexibility not achievable by firm-fixed-price contract
is needed.
g. Other type incentive contracts are not suitable to the
function.
h. The work is such that encouragement of contractor
innovation is likely to result in a tangible pay-back
to the government. [Ref. 6: p. 4]
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E. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
The Award Fee type of contract, like all contracts, has
advantages and disadvantages. They are:
1. Advantages
a. Gives the Government more flexibility in managing the
contract, by allowing them to take into consideration
the dynamic process of performing the contract and
providing room for human judgment.
b. Enhances communication and cooperation between the
Government and the contractor by giving the contractor
continuous feedback during performance of the contract.
c. Allows the Government an active management role.
d. Helps to recognize limitations of the contractor's
management ability to control contract performance.
2. Disadvantages
a. Causes a significant administrative burden in
developing, implementing and managing the contract.
b. Is difficult to maintain timely information necessary
for evaluation and award. This is important to assure
efficient performance feedback which motivates the
contractor.
c. Can create doubt in the contractor that the evaluation
process is not objective, therefore causing undesirable
results.
Personal interviews with five contract administrators
reinforced the above advantages and disadvantages. These
interviews revealed the following additional comments:
(1) The contractors are highly motivated towards better
performance when the evaluation period is reasonable
and not too long and also when the amount of the Award
Fee is sufficient [Refs. 10, 11, and 12].
(2) In Umbrella contracts that include an award-fee
evaluation for every delivery order, it is too
complicated and time-consuming to evaluate every
delivery order separately. In this case, the
contractor receives the award fee too late for it to be
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perceived as a motivating factor. The award fee can be
perceived as an unnecessary headache [Ref. 13].
(3) The administration of an award-fee contract is
complicated and must be done efficiently in order to
obtain favorable results. If the evaluation process is
not appropriately conducted or the effort involved in
achieving it is too high compared to the amount of the
award, the contractor will lose this motivation to
improve performance.
(4) In contracts for end-products or continual services
(when end results are important) the contractor can be
better motivated if the portion of the award fee which
has been withheld from the contractor is rolled-over
into the next period. In this case, the contractor,
motivated by a greater amount in the next period, will
contribute a greater effort towards achieving the award
fee, thereby giving the Government the best result
[Ref. 14].
F. SUMMARY
This chapter provided background on the Award Fee type of
contract and the procedures for awarding and administrating it
in the Department of Defense.
The next chapter will outline in general terms the typical
acquisition process, discuss and compare the Israeli MOD
organization and a DoD contract administration activity to
determine if there are any organizational structural
impediments to the implement of Award Fee types of contracts
in the Israeli MOD regulations.
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IV. COMPARISON OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES: UNITED
STATES NAVY SUPERVISOR OF SHIPBUILDING CONVERSION AND
REPAIR VERSUS THE ISRAELI MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter is organized into four separate sections.
The first section will outline in general terms the typical
acquisition process which is being followed by both the United
States and Israel. The second section will outline and
discuss how a DoD contract administration activity is
organized to administer contracts and in particular Award Fee
type contracts. The United States Navy's Supervisor of
Shipbuilding Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP) was chosen
because of its unique similarities to the Israeli Ministry of
Defense in terms of size and functions. The third section
will outline and discuss how the Israeli Ministry of Defense
(MOD) is organized to manage the contracting function for
Israel. Finally, the fourth section is a comparison of the
two activities, the purpose of which is to determine if there
are any organizational structural impediments to the
implementation of the Award Fee types of contracts into the
Israeli MOD regulations.
B. THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
The acquisition process is characterized as the typical
chain of events that occur when acquiring supplies and
services. The steps in the acquisition process are basically
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the same when comparing Israel and the United States. The
major difference is in the amount of literature available for
research. Therefore, this discussion is based on American
literature and the Israeli work experience of the researcher.
The typical steps in the acquisition process can be divided
into the following phases:














1. Identification of Needs
This is the first phase of the acquisition process,
which require the examination of the projected threat and the
ability of the existing systems or facilities to meet the
threat.
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This is done by the professionals in each specific
area, based on an evaluation of the current situation and of
its potential dangers in order to meet defense objectives.
2 . Concept Exploration/Definition
The objective of this phase is to select the most
promising system concepts. The Program Manager's Guide
explains the procedure for this phase:
The PM will solicit and evaluate alternative concepts that
will meet or exceed the need expressed in the Mission Need
Statement. [Ref. 15:pp. 1-13]
The professionals will define the best alternative
under budget and schedule limitations.
3. Specification Development
The next step in the process is to develop the
specifications for the desired system. The FAR defines a
specification as:
A description of the technical requirement for a material,
product, or service that includes the criteria for
determining that the requirement has been met [Ref. 16 :p.
10.001]
The Program Manager's says:
The system specification is used to state technical and
mission requirements for the system, allocate requirements
to functional areas, and define interfaces between
functional areas. [Ref. 15:pp. 4-39]
4 . Funding
Funding is the act of reserving money for a specific
purpose. The funds may not be used for anything else.
Stanley N. Sherman states that:
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The funding level of a contract operates as a legal
limitation on the total obligation of the Government to
make payments. [Ref. 17: p. 282]
5. Procurement Request
The procurement request begins the procurement phase
of the acquisition process. It should include the
specifications and the funding for the requirement. The
Program Manager's Guide defines it as:
The most vital document that supports the communication
between the PM and the contracting officer .... The
purpose of the Procurement request is to provide
information that: (1) describes the required supplies
requirement or services clearly and completely . . . (2)
support any contractual recommendations it may contain.
[Ref. 15:pp. 4-35]
6. Market Research
The objective of this phase is to locate potential
suppliers for the specific purchase by evaluating their
capabilities, as explained in the Reference book for
competition requirements:
Attempts to ascertain if qualified sources capable of
satisfying the Government requirements exist. Action taken
to find potential sources to fill the Department of
Defense acquisition requirements. [Ref. 18:p. 5].
An additional explanation to Market Research can be
found in the FAR definition:
The process used for collecting and analyzing information
about the entire market available to satisfy the minimum
agency needs to arrive at the most suitable approach to
acquiring, distributing, and supporting supplies and
services. [Ref. 16:p. 10.001]
7. Contract Solicitation
This is a formal request by the Government to
potential contractors for an offer. It communicates the
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Government s needs in the form of purchase descriptions or
specifications and solicits bids, proposals or quotes.
8. Bid/Proposal Evaluation
In this phase, the Government will evaluate the offers
to find the best-valued offer. This includes tradeoffs of
cost and technical parameters. The FAR defines proposal
evaluation as:
An assessment of both the proposal and the offeror's
ability (as conveyed by the proposal) to successfully
accomplish the prospective contract. An agency shall
evaluate competitive proposals solely on the factors
specified in the solicitation. [Ref. 16:p. 15.608]
The complexity of the proposal evaluation depends on
the complexity of the system being purchased and on the
purchase method used (sealed bid or negotiation) . The
Department of Defense Directive emphasizes that the evaluation
must consider:
The technical, schedule, operational readiness and
support, and financial risk inherent in a proposal. [Ref.
19:p. 20]
9. Contract Negotiations
The FAR defines negotiations as:
Contracting through the use of either competitive or
other-than-competitive proposals and discussions. Any
contract awarded without using sealed biding procedures is
a negotiated contract [Ref. 16 :p. 15.101]
The Government, after evaluating the offers,
negotiates the final price and comes to agreement on the
contract terms and conditions with the potential contractor.
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10. Contract Award
This is a legal notification to the contractor of the
Government's acceptance of their offer. The contract document
outlines the agreement between the parties.
11. Contract Administration
The contract administration phase starts after
contract award and ends when the contract is closed.
Personnel who work in contract administration ensure that the
Government receives the supplies and services outlined by the
terms and conditions of the contract. Stanley N. Sherman
outlines six broad categories that are included in contract
administration responsibilities:
* Monitoring and surveillance functions
* Reports and services to procuring office and contractor
* Reviews and audits of contractor internal management
system
* Formal decisions and actions affecting contractors
* Direction, negotiations, and agreements





Government acceptance means the Government has taken
ownership of the end item and released the contractor from any
further obligations on the contract.
13. Contract Payment
This phase accomplishes the Government's commitment
in the contract. The FAR defines Invoice Payment, as:
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A Government disbursement of monies to a contractor under
a contract or other authorization for supplies or services
accepted by the Government. [Ref. 16: p. 32.902]
14. Contract Closeout
The last phase in the procurement process is called
contract closeout which signifies that the contractor and the
government have fulfilled all obligations outlined in the
contract. The completed contract file is normally retained
for a period of time after the contract is closed.
C. THE SUPERVISOR OF SHIPBUILDING CONVERSION AND
REPAIR, USN
The Supervisor of Shipbuilding Conversion and Repair, USN
was chosen for comparison with the Israeli MOD because of the
following factors. First, a SUPSHIP can range in size from
approximately 70 personnel at the smallest SUPSHIP to 550 at
the largest SUPSHIP. This compares favorably with the 600
personnel in the Israeli MOD. Second, the SUPSHIPs have the
authority to both award contracts, in the form of Job Orders
against Master Ship Repair Agreements, and to administer
contracts awarded to those companies under their cognizance.
Third, the SUPSHIPs award and administer Award Fee types of
contracts.
The SUPSHIP is organized into various departments as
depicted in Figure 1.
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1. Contract Department
The Contract Department is responsible for the:
Administration of all matters relating to contractual
accounting and financial aspects of contracts and the
award and administration of Master Ship Repair Agreements
and Job Orders. [Ref. 20 :p. 15]
Figure 2 shows the Contract Department organization.
It consists of 4 divisions: Procurement Division, Contract
Administration Division, Proposal Evaluation Division, and
Budget & Finance Division.
a. Procurement Division
The Procurement Division is established if there
is a need to award contracts for the repair of Naval ships.
Otherwise, it may be combined with the Administrating
Department. The typical responsibilities of this division
include:
* Entering into Master Ship Repair Agreements (MSRA)
* Accomplishing the procurement for repair and overhaul
services under MSRA's including:
Determining the method of procurement (sealed bid or
negotiation)
.
Preparing and distributing the solicitation package
(IFB, RFP, drawings, specifications, etc.).
Receiving, storing, opening and tabulating bids or
offers received.
Requesting pre-award survey as required.
Selecting the source.
Preparing and obtaining business clearance.
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Figure 2
Contract Department [Ref. 20: p. 14]
The PCO uses subject matter experts from the
operational commands as advisors and the Engineering
Department for all technical aspects. They also use the ACO
findings and recommendations on contractor proposals to make
decisions regarding the price of the contract.
b. Contract Administration Division
After a contract or Job Order is awarded, it is
assigned to the Contract Administration Division who performs
the Contract Administration responsibilities. The
Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) is responsible for
For New Construction SUPSHIPs with Repair Department (600)
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the acquisition process starting at Contract Award to Contract
Closeout. The USN Organization Manual lists the
responsibilities of the Contract Administration Division as:
* Administer all contractual aspects of assigned contract.
* Process Headquarter and Field Modification Requests for
new construction contracts.
* Negotiate equitable price and other contractual
adjustments resulting from changes.
* Certify contractor invoices or vouchers for payment.
* Adjudicate final contract settlements.
* Maintain close coordination with the Engineering
Department, the Quality Assurance Department, and the
Material Department. [Ref. 20:p. 16]
c. Proposal Evaluation Division
The Proposal Evaluation Division is responsible
for reviewing and evaluating a contractor's proposal to
determine if the price is fair and reasonable. This division
performs as an advisor to the PCO and the ACO. Their
evaluations are provided to the Procurement Division and/or to
the Contract Administration Division to support their
negotiations. The duties of the Proposal Evaluation Division
as defined in the USN Organization Manual are:
* Review and evaluate the contractor's proposals and
furnish comments to the procuring and administrative
contracting officers for purposes of negotiations.
* Prepare Technical Advisory Reports.
* Prepare Field Pricing Reports.
* Perform price and cost analysis and develop independent
estimates as may be require for adjudication.
44
* Review the contractor • s work scope of proposed changes
and reach a work scope understanding.
* Determine the effect of changes in delivery schedules and
the attendant disruptive effects of proposed work scope
changes
.
* Develop and maintain a data bank of historical cost
information. [Ref. 20:p. 17]
d. Budget and Finance Division
This division is responsible for the administra-
tion of the SUPSHIP's internal budget and accounting, and
administers the financial accounting of the funds obligated in
each contract assigned to the SUPSHIP.
2. Project Office
The project office is responsible for the overall
coordination of the contract administration activity for each
assigned contract. A project office is normally established
for each new contract to be administered and is located at the
contractor's work site.
3. Engineering Department
The Engineering Department provides engineering,
technical and design recommendations or oversight. This
technical department includes divisions for specific technical
areas such as: Engineering System Management Division, Hull/
Naval Architecture Division, Electrical Division, Mechanical
Division, and Combat System Division.
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D. THE ISRAELI MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (MOD) ORGANIZATION
The basic principle used in organizing the defense of
Israel has not changed since Israel was established in 1940.
It divides the mission to defend Israel between two separate
organizations under the Minister of Defense (Figure 3) . The
first is a military organization called the Israeli Defense
Force (IDF) and the second is a civilian organization called
the Ministry of Defense (MOD). The IDF's mission is to
protect Israel from the threat of its enemies and the MOD'S
mission is to support the IDF. The relevant acquisition
functions and responsibilities of both organizations will be
discussed in the following pages.
1. The Israeli Defense Force Functions and
Responsibilities
The IDF is divided into five services which operate
directly under the Chief of the General Staff. The services
are: Air-Force, Ground-Force, Navy, Maintenance, and
Transportation. Each service is divided into functional
sections which are principally similar to each other. The
Navy organization is the principal focus of this thesis and is
illustrated in Figure 4. The sections within the Navy which
are related to the acquisition process are:
a. Supply and Supply & Maintenance Base
The Supply & Maintenance Base segment receives,

















The Israeli Defense Organization
b. Equipment Supply
The Equipment Supply segment generates the mission
needs, requirements definition, specifications development,
and funding of the weapon systems and submits its requests for
purchase to the MOD. The Equipment Supply segment contains
functional departments divided into branches and further into























The Navy Organization (with respect
to acguisition process) [Ref. 21:p. 15]
and has a direct working relationship with the defense
contractors. Within the sections, there is a program manager,
who is involved with the contractor for all technical aspects
of the development and production of a product. The program
48
manager serves as the technical advisor/liaison point between
the IDF and the MOD representative for specific purchases.
Each service has a Test Unit. In the Navy
organization, it is within the Equipment Supply segment under
the head of the Integrated Logistics Branch as shown in Figure
4. This unit is responsible for the acceptance tests for all
the MOD'S purchases in support of a specific service.
Combat readiness, from the acquisition point of
view, means being responsible for the following phases of the
acquisition process: the Identification of Needs, Concept
Exploration/Definition, Specification Development, Funding,
and Procurement Request. The IDF is responsible for all these
phases. Because the IDF has the technical capability, it is
also responsible for performing the acceptance tests.
2. The Ministry Of Defense Functions and Responsibilities
The MOD has two segments actively involved in the
acquisition process: The Finance Department and the
Department of Procurement and Production (DOPP)
.
a. Finance Department
The Finance Department is a civilian organization
which is under the Director General MOD who is also in charge
of the DOPP. The Finance Department is responsible for all
bill payments, after approval is obtained from the DOPP
representative. As shown in Figure 3. The payment function is
separated from the buying function.
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b. Department of Procurement and Production (DOPP)
The DOPP is a matrix organization which includes
a Deputy for Economics Affairs (DEA) and five divisions
(Figure 5.)
(1) Deputy for Economic Affairs (DEA) . The DEA
office provides support in two major areas:
(a) As advisors to the buyers. Each division and each
branch of the DOPP is supported by a designated
economic advisor. They provide guidance and advise on
the procurement regulations. They participate in major
negotiations, approve contracts before they are
awarded, and are involved in solving problems during
contract administration.
(b) The DEA personnel determine labor rates for specific
contractors, and approve pricing-data and contract
prices.
(2) Divisions. Each division procures and
administers contracts for weapon systems and is organized to
support a specific service in the IDF. Thus each division
will process procurement requests only for its corresponding






































Naval Group Skeleton Organization
Within the acguisition process, the MOD is
responsible for: Market Research, Contract Solicitation,
Bid/Proposal Evaluation, Contract Negotiation, Contract
Award, Contract Administration, Government Acceptance, Contract
Payment and Contract Closeout.
Acceptance is the MOD'S responsibility even
though the IDF performs the acceptance tests. If there is a
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disagreement between the Test Unit and the contractor, the MOD
representative has the final decision.
E. ORGANIZING THE ISRAELI MINISTRY OF DEFENSE TO ADMINISTER
AWARD FEE TYPES CONTRACTS
After comparing the SUPSHIP organization to the Israeli
MOD organization, it became clear that functionally they were
almost identical. If it could be assumed that the SUPSHIP
organization evolved over time and is today reflective of an
efficient and successful organizational structure, it would
make sense to see if the Israeli MOD organization could fit
into a similar structure. This structure would be one
specifically set up to administer Award Fee types contracts.
The following is an attempt to investigate if the Israeli MOD
organization could easily mirror the SUPSHIP Award Fee
administration organization.
1. SUPSHIP Award Fee Function
An example of the functional SUPSHIP personnel who
usually participate on Award Fee teams are defined in SUPSHIP
Seattle Instruction 4330. 6A from 15 July 1986. They are:
a. Fee Determination Official (FDO)
The supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and
Repair.
b. Award Fee Board
Voting members:
The Chairperson - Supervisor of Shipbuilding or Head of the
Contract Department.
The Board - Head of Contract Department.
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- TYCOM representative (customer)
.
- NAVSEA representative (customer)
.
- Heads of the relevant departments within the SUPSHIP.
Non-voting members:
Evaluation coordinator - designated by the Contracting
Officer.
Contracting Officer Advisor.
Award Fee Liaison Officer - The intermediator between
the contractor and the SUPSHIP.
Recorder
c. Award Fee Monitors
The monitors are on-site personnel who have direct
knowledge of the contractor's performance. They are
designated by the Contracting Officer.
2. Israeli Ministry Of Defense Award Fee Function
This section will suggest an organization for
administering Award Fee types of contracts in the Israeli MOD.
The recommended administrative organization is based on the
organization used by a SUPSHIP and is outlined below:
a. Award Fee Determining Official
The Award Fee Determining Official (AFDO) , will be
the head of the DOPP or the head of the relevant Division.
The DOPP is the highest level in the MOD
procurement organization and is suggested to be the AFDO in
large contracts because of his overall responsibility.
The Division head responsibilities and duties are
an a parallel to those of the Supervisor of Shipbuilding
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because the both have the responsibility to procure and
administer contracts. The Division head position is ideal for
assignment as the AFDO.
b. Award Review Board
The Chairperson - DIV head or BR head
BR head or SEC head
Representative of Deputy for Economic Affairs.
Representative of the IDF Functional Branch.
(customer)
The Board should include heads of the organiza-
tions which directly benefit from the contract. This is the
representative from the IDF Functional Branch. The represen-
tative of the Deputy for Economic Affairs is recommended as a
member of the board because their opinion is very important to
the evaluation of the ARB.
c. Award Fee Monitors
The monitors are the personnel who have the
knowledge of the contractor's performance. Within the Israeli
MOD these are the MOD Basic Unit personnel, an economist under
the Deputy for Economic Affairs, and the IDF program manager.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter compared the structural organizations of the
Israeli MOD organization and the U.S. Navy's Supervisor of
Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair organization. As a result
of this comparison, it was determined that the differences
between these two organizations were insignificant and the
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administration of Award Fee types of contracts can be
implement with basically no change in the Israeli MOD
organization.
The next chapter will identify and discuss the barriers
that need to be overcome when implementing the use of Award
Fee types of contracts in the Israeli MOD.
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V. BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTATION BY THE ISRAELI
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
In order to make an informed decision whether to implement
the Award Fee types of contracts in the Israeli Ministry of
Defense (MOD) , the Israeli Government should take into
consideration the potential barriers to its successful
implementation. In an effort to identify these barriers, the
researcher accomplished the following:
* conducted an extensive literature review on the subject
of Award Fee types of contracts and their use in the
United States in an effort to identify any written
discussions on implementation barriers.
* conducted numerous telephone interviews with Procuring
Contracting Officers and Administrative Contracting
Officers primarily in the U.S. Navy to obtain an
understanding of the Award Fee types of contracts and to
solicit their views on potential implementation barriers.
* sent a questionnaire to the Economists and Section Heads
in the Israeli DOPP in an effort to obtain the views from
personnel who would be using this type of contract.
A. RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE
A questionnaire was sent to the Economists and Section
Heads in the Israeli DOPP. This questionnaire (Appendix B)
,
outlined the Award Fee types of contracts and requested their
thoughts, ideas, impressions, doubts and reservations with
regards to implementing the Award Fee types of contracts.
The questionnaire was sent to personnel who occupy the
levels within the Department of Procurement and Production
(DOPP) who are involved with the daily business. These
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officials are very knowledgeable and familiar with the
problems associated with using the existing contracts types
and therefore are perfectly suited to answer the
questionnaire. The DOPP is very small in size and therefore
the responses received were in many ways a summary of all
their opinions.
The twelve responses received were written in Hebrew and
ranged from acceptance of the Award Fee types of contracts to
total rejection. The discussion below is an English
translation of the responses. The responses discuss various
barriers that must be overcome. The researcher's analysis of
the barriers is also included in the discussion.
1. Administration burden
The vast majority of the responses were concerned with
the increased administrative burden that this type of contract
requires. They felt that they did not have the manpower to
effectively utilitize this types of contracts. This lack of
manpower can be divided into two categories:
* number of people
* number of technically trained people
The need for professional and skilled personnel who would
serve as Award Fee monitors is critical for the success of
this type of contract and therefore is a valid concern. The
existing Israeli organization separates its functions between
the MOD and the IDF. It would take a joint effort by both IDF
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and MOD professional personnel to satisfy the need for
qualified award fee monitors.
The significant administrative burden associated with
the Award Fee types of contracts is also identified as a
barrier in the literature. That is why it is imperative that
a cost/benefit analysis is conducted before this type of
contract is selected. There will be times when the benefits
derived from increased contractor attention to the areas to be
evaluated, will greatly outweigh the additional administrative
costs. Only then should this type of contract be used.
2 . Lack of adequate Funding
A majority of the responses centered on the funding
issue. They felt that they couldn't use these types of
contracts because funding would not be available for the award
fee portion.
This concern was based on the procurement funding
procedures being followed in Israel. The IDF sends a
procurement request to the MOD for purchasing with estimated
funds already committed. This funding is provided before the
decision on the type of contract to be used. If additional
funds are required, the MOD must request the funding from the
IDF. This is perceived to be a barrier because it is believed
that the IDF will not provide any additional funding if the




The U.S. literature did not discuss funding as a
barrier because if it was determined that the Award Fee
contract is the most beneficial type of contract to use, U.S.
requiring activities were willing to provide the additional
funding. Secondly, it should not be assumed that the Award
Fee type of contract would cost more than any other type of
contract. If a Cost Type contract is envisioned, the fee
portion could easily be restructured and used in the award fee
format with a smaller fixed fee and a portion for the award
fee. If a Firm Fixed-Price type of contract is envisioned,
the award fee portion is figured into the profit analysis and
negotiated accordingly.
3. Difficulties in Defining the Evaluation criteria
Three of the respondents felt that the ability of the
IDF personnel to develop good award fee evaluation criteria
was a barrier.
The award fee evaluation criteria are the cornerstone
of the Award Fee types of contracts and therefore this is a
valid barrier. U.S. literature identifies the need for very
clear and meaningful criteria as one of the most important
factors when considering the use of Award Fee types of
contracts. A U.S. Army Handbook entitled the "Handbook for
CPAF contracts" provided the following list of questions that
should be answered before selecting the evaluation criteria to
be used:
Is the element meaningful and important to overall
performance objectives?
60
Is the element consistent with other elements in the
plan?
Is the element sending the contractor the right message
about contract performance?
Is it described discretely so that there will be no
unnecessary duplication in the evaluation process? [Ref
.
22:p. 10]
It is true that the Israeli MOD should be concerned
with the ability of the IDF to properly write and select the
evaluation criteria, but it is believed that this barrier can
be overcome through training and acquisition planning.
4. Bias in evaluation process
Two of the respondents felt that the Award Fee types
of contracts could foster a biased behavior from the award fee
monitors. This behavior could be either for or against the
contractor. This could either destroy the relationship with
the contractor or destroy the integrity of the award fee
process.
There is no doubt that when a person has some power to
affect the profitability of another, it presents potential
pressures for biased behavior and therefore this is a valid
concern. Whether or not this is a barrier is a question that
is worth discussing. The potential for biased behavior is
always present in the field of contract administration and the
Israeli Government has taken many steps to ensure that this
type of behavior is not present. There are many checks and
balances built into the contracting system and this is the
case for this type of contract.
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In the U.S. literature, the Army Handbook for CPAF
Contracts emphasizes that:
It is extremely important that the established award fee
determination system . . . contain appropriate checks and
balances for maintaining its impartiality. [Ref. 23 :p.
24]
There are four tools in the administration of Award
Fee types of contracts that could be used to eliminate
potential bias in the evaluation process. These four tools
are:
a. The Award Fee Review Board evaluates the contractor
performance based on the performance monitoring. The ARB
members are people that are not involved in the day-to-
day work with the contractor. However, they are close
enough to the work to be able to evaluate the performance
monitoring records. The U.S. Air Force's Base-Level
Guide states the purpose of the ARB as:
. . . to operate under the principles of fairness and
justice to the Government and the contractor. In order to
accomplish their purpose, each PEB (ARB) member must
listen carefully to each individual who briefs the board
and read for understanding all documents submitted . . .
they are not bound to automatically "rubber stamp" the
recommendation presented by any of the briefers. [Ref. 6:
p. 53]
b. The last decision on the amount of the fee awarded is
done by the Award Fee Determination Official who is a
high level official with a wide view of the situation
and who will not be biased by the day-to-day incidents.
The U.S. Air Force's Base-Level Award Fee Guide
expressed the position of the AFDO as:
The AFDO should be the senior ranking commander on base .
. . . This allows the Air Force to have an individual who
has a direct interest in the quality of the service, but
is far enough removed from observing daily performance, to
allow for a fair fee determination based on the
recommendation of the ARB.
The AFDO ideally maintains a natural relationship during
each performance evaluation period with regard to having
any responsibility to observe contractor performance, or
62
receive any intermediate performance report. [Ref. 6: pp.
56, 57]
c. A contractor representative can sit in the ARB. This
person has the ability to ask the Award Fee monitors for
clarification of their determinations. This helps
eliminate any bias in the reports. The U.S. Navy's
SUPSHIP Seattle Instruction 4330.6a stated that:
The contractor may be invited, and open discussion on
performance matters may be held .... The contractor may
submit written responses to the reports to which the Award
Fee Monitor may reply, if applicable. [Ref. 22: p. 6]
d. The contractor, in the written responses, can also
present a performance report to the ARB. The report
will provide the contractor's assessment of the grades
they earned as evaluated by his personnel. Differences
between the contractor's report and the performance
monitoring reports help the ARB to find and eliminate
bias in the performance monitoring reports.
The potential for any bias in the evaluation process
is always present, but the checks and balances built into the
award fee process are more than adequate to counteract that
potential.
5. Limited use for the Award Fee types of contracts
Two respondents felt that there was only limited
application for these types of contracts.
They felt that the Award Fee types of contract can be
used only in sole source negotiations and not in competitive
situations. This is because the payment of the award fee pool
depends on the evaluation of the contractor performance and is
different for each contractor. They felt that because the
evaluation criteria are known, each contractor can estimate
the potential payments from the award fee pool. That means
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that the total amount of money to be made by one contractor
may be different from the amount another can make.
This concern is not valid as an impediment. The Award
Fee types of contracts can be used in both sole source and
competitive situations. In competitive situations, the award
fee portion can either be left out of the evaluation for award
since it could be made the same for all offerors or it could
be submitted as a competitive element for consideration of the
award. The U.S. Department of Defense normally uses the
competitive negotiation method when soliciting requirements
that will be administered under an Award Fee type of contract.
B. OTHER BARRIERS
The barriers discussed above were specific to the
Questionnaire sent to the Economists and Section Heads within
the Israeli DOPP. The following are two additional barriers
that should be considered when implementing the Award Fee
types of contracts into the Israeli MOD regulations:
1. Size of the Award Fee Pool
The size of the Award Fee Pool was not raised as a
concern by the respondents to the survey but if an inadequate
amount of money is put into the award fee pool, it will not
provide an adequate amount of incentive to the contractor to
stimulate his best efforts. This is a definite barrier
because there must be a commitment to adequately fund the
award fee pool. It should be large enough to motivate the
contractor, but not too large to cause the contractor to
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concentrate more on the award fee criteria instead of the
contract requirements.
2. Attitude of the people
The attitude of the people charged with the
implementation of any change is very important to its success.
Often people are uncomfortable when changes occur and their
resistance to that change effectively guarantees its failure.
The Award Fee type of contract can provide the contracting
officer with a type of contract that properly motivates a
contractor where other contract types fail. It should be
considered and at a minimum, tested in Israel. It has been a
successful type of contract in the United States. The
benefits that this type of contract could bring to Israel
should be strongly considered and its implementation
positively motivated from the highest levels.
C. SUMMARY
This chapter discussed the possible barriers to the
implementation of the Award Fee types of contracts in the
Israeli MOD regulations. The first section dealt with
barriers expressed as concerns by personnel within the Israeli
MOD organization. The second section discussed additional
barriers discovered in the literature. These barriers must be
taken into consideration when considering the use of these
types of contracts but they can be overcome by the Israeli
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Government. The next chapter is a short guide that can be
followed when implementing the Award Fee types of contracts in
the Israeli MOD.
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VI. IMPLEMENTING THE AWARD FEE TYPES OF CONTRACTS
IN THE ISRAELI MOD
A. INTRODUCTION
Various types of contracts are available to the MOD
buyers. Each buyer must have a clear understanding of all
types of contracts available for use in order to have the
maximum flexibility needed to support the IDF's mission
requirements. Adding the Award Fee types of contracts to the
types already in existence in the MOD regulations would
greatly enhance the available options to the buyers.
The purpose of this chapter is to serve as a guide for use
in implementing the Award Fee types of contracts into the
Israeli MOD regulation.
B. AWARD FEE CONTRACTS
The Award Fee types of contracts are incentive types of
contracts, which motivate a contractor to improve performance
in specific categories beyond the minimum requirements
outlined in the contract. These categories are selected by
the Government for special emphasis by the contractor. There
is a separate pool of money that is designated for award to
the contractor for evaluated performance in these specified
categories. Based on a subjective evaluation process, the
Government can withhold a portion of the award fee due to less
than excellent performance.
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The Award Fee contracts are different from other incentive
contracts in the flexibility they provide the Government in
managing the contract and the feedback mechanism which
improves the communications between the Government and the
contractor.
Every Award Fee type of contract (FPAF and CPAF) can be
divided into two sections:
Basic contract - In CPAF type contracts, the basic
contract is a Cost type, which includes the estimated cost and
the Based Fee. In FPAF type contracts, the basic contract is
a Fixed Price type contract.
Award Fee - The portion of the Award Fee pool.
1. Fixed Price Award Fee (FPAF)
a. The concept of the FPAF
The FPAF contract is essentially a FFP contract
with the exception of the additional pool of money. This
money is used to motivate contractors to improve the guality
of performance, allowing the Government to more closely
monitor a contractor's performance (technical, management).
The United States Air Force Base-Level Award Fee
Guide summarizes the differences between FFP and FPAF as
follows:
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FFP promotes: FPAF Dromotes:
Motivation by Contractors
to Cut Costs.








vs Interpreting the Spirit
Of the Contract
Figure 1
Differences between FFP and FPAF contracts
[Ref. 6:p. 3]
b. Use of FPAF
The FPAF type of contract can be used when the
following conditions exist:
(1) Conditions for Fixed Price:
(a) The price can be justified as fair and reasonable.
(b) There are reasonably definite design or performance
specifications
.
(c) Uncertified performance can be identified and
reasonably estimated as cost variants.
(d) There is an adequately competitive market.
(2) Conditions for FPAF:
(a) There is a need for the flexibility that is not
achievable in a Fixed Price contract.
(b) There is a history of performance problems.
(c) The contract is of high value and the additional
administrative effort and cost required to monitor and
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evaluate performance would be justified by the expected
benefits.
2. Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF)
a. The concept of the CPAF
The CPAF type of contract is a typical Cost type
contract with a special fee provision. The fee in a CPAF
contract consists of two parts:
(1) Base Fee :
A fixed fee that does not vary with performance or
costs. The Base Fee can be zero in a CPAF contract.
This fee is designed to compensate the contractor for
factors such as risk assumption, investment and the
nature of the work.
(2) Award Fee pool :
An additional pool of money used to motivate the
contractor to improve the quality of performance and
allow the Government personnel to more closely monitor
a contractor's performance (technical, management).
This fee is earned by the contractor for performance
that demonstrates quality effort toward accomplishing
the tasks and functions cited in the contract.
b. Use of CPAF
The CPAF type of contract can be used when the
following sets of conditions exist:
(1) Conditions for Cost Reimbursement:
(a) The use of any type of Fixed Price is not appropriate.
(b) Level of effort is required.
(c) High technical and cost uncertainty exists.
(d) Performance requirements are difficult to define.
(e) There is no way to estimate the cost.
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(2) Conditions for Award Fee:
(a) The contractor's performance involves multiple tasks or
functions within a broad scope of the work.
(b) There is a need for flexibility in managing the
contract. This is the ability to change the
performance emphasis during the contract executing
phase.
(c) Other types of incentive contracts are not suitable for
the task.
(d) The Government believes that involvement of its top
management officials in the contractor's evaluation
would be beneficial.
(e) The additional administrative effort and cost required
to monitor and evaluate performance would be justified
by the expected benefits.
C. PLANNING
Contract planning should begin in the early stages of the
procurement cycle, as soon as the Procurement Request is
received in the MOD, and the head of the Basic Unit decides to
use the Award Fee type of contract for the specific purchase.
This planning is particularly important in Award Fee contracts
because of the special administrative requirements. This
early planning should include:
1. Development of a comprehensive Award Fee Plan (AFP)
which includes the criteria and the organizational
structure needed for assessing and evaluating contractor




Development of the Request For Proposal (RFP) which
identifies the Award Fee features and explains how they
should be addressed in the submitted offers.
3 Development of the proposed contract clauses that
specify the Award Fee feature.
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4. Request for additional funds, if needed for the Award
Fee pool
.
The discussion on (2) RFP and (3) proposed contract
clauses will be contained in the discussion on the specific
phase of the process.
1. The Award Fee Plan (AFP)
The purpose of the AFP as defined in the Army Handbook
for CPAF contracts is:
... to articulate in one document the plan and means for
assessing and evaluating contractor performance for
determining the award fee to be awarded. The plan also
serves as a charter for the organizational structure
required to administer the award fee provision of a
contract. [Ref. 23 :p. 5]
The development of an AFP must be a team effort by MOD
and IDF personnel. It is very important that these team
members be identified as early as possible to assign their
respective responsibilities for development of the plan.
If the team discovers that allocated funds are not
sufficient for the Award Fee contract, they should delay the
RFP until receiving the required funding.
The AFP should be practical and simple. It should
address exactly what performance the Government considers to
be important and the evaluation criteria by which the
performance level will be measured. The plan should strive
for the most efficient amount of effort to administer the
contract.
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The AFP will specify:
1. The functional area to be evaluated.
2. The criteria to be used in the evaluation. The criteria
should be carefully designed to be very clear, and
separate from the contract specifications.




The method to measure the contractor • s performance
against these criteria and the formula to calculate the
performance grade.
5. The amount of money contained in the Award Fee Pool and
the Base Fee (in case of CPAF) . The total fee should be
limited in the regulation as a percentage of the
estimated costs. This is to ensure that the Award Fee
pool will be sufficient to motivate the contractor but
not too large to cause the contractor to concentrate
more on the award fee criteria instead of the contract
requirements
.
6. A list of the members in the Award Review Board (ARB)
and the Award Fee Determination Official (AFDO)
.
Appendix A contains an example of an Award Fee
contract. The contract includes all the elements of the Award
Fee plan.
D. SOLICITATION
The solicitation is issued for both sealed bid and
negotiation. In both cases, the solicitation should include
in addition to the technical specifications and the terms and
conditions of the basic contract, all the necessary
information regarding the Award Fee provisions such as:
1. Explanation of the Award Fee Concept.
2. The functional areas to be evaluated.
3. The criteria and weighted formula to calculate the
amount of the award fee.
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4.
The method to measure the performance and the technique
to grade it.
5. Evaluation period.
6. The amount of money designated to the Award Fee Pool for
each evaluation period, and in case of the CPAF, it
should also include the Base fee.
7. Method of rollover, if desired.
Because all of the information described here is included
in the Award Fee Provision, an illustration of this
information can be found in Appendix A.
E. SOURCE SELECTION
The decision on which prospective contractor to award the
contract depends on the technical and cost proposals
evaluation. The use of the Award Fee concept does not change
the method used in source selection. This is because the
Award Fee is separate from the basic contract and will be the
same for all contractors. The Award Fee amount which the
contractor can earn depends on the evaluation of the
contractor's performance against the specific criteria and not
on the cost or the technical specifications of the contract.
This assures that even under the sealed bid method, the
conditions for competition still exist.
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F. CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION
The administration of Award Fee types of contracts plays
a very important role towards achieving the objectives of this
type of contract. It must be efficient in order to compensate
for the additional effort required by this type of contract.
The administration of the Award Fee types of contracts
should be organized on three basic levels:
Performance monitoring;
Award Review Board (ARB)
;
Award Fee Determination Official (AFDO)
.
1. Performance monitoring
The day-to-day monitoring of the contractor's
technical performance is carried out by the I.D.F PM and his
staff. The day-to-day monitoring of all other aspects of the
contract is carried out by the head of the Basic unit (BU) and
his staff, an economist under the Deputy for Economic Affairs,
and the IDF program manager. These people should be familiar
with the contract's AFP in order to monitor the contractor's
performance for the Award Fee evaluation. They must also
document and report their observations of the contractor's
performance. They evaluate the performance according to the
Award Fee Plan criteria and present it to the ARB.
2. Award Review Board (ARB)
The contractor's performance evaluation for each
period will be reviewed by the Award Review Board (ARB)
consisting of:
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a. The Chairperson (The first signer on the contract -
Division head or Branch head)
b. Section head
c. Representative of Deputy for Economic Affairs
d. Representative of the IDF Functional Branch
e. Contractor representative (non-voting)
.
At the end of each evaluation period the ARB will
prepare a recommendation on the amount of Award Fee to be paid
to the contractor. This recommendation is given to the AFDO
for his final decision. It is based on the board member's
experience, the reports they receive from the performance
monitors, and the calculation of the score according to the
formula in the contract.
They also recommend to the AFDO necessary changes in
the weighted factors based on the contractor's performance in
the last evaluation period.
The contractor has the opportunity to be represented
in the ARB evaluation even though he has no voting rights on
the board. The contractor representative can ask the
Performance Monitoring personnel clarifying questions about
their reports and express the contractor point of view on the
reports. The contractor also provides his own evaluation of
his performance to the ARB. This enhances the line of
communication between the Government and the contractor.
3. Award Fee Determining Official (AFDO)
The Award Fee Determining Official (AFDO) should be
the head of the Department of Procurement and Production or
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the head of the Division (the second signer on the contract)
.
He is responsible for determining the award fee to be paid to
the contractor, based upon the performance evaluation
conducted by the ARB. He also approves any changes in the
Award Fee Plan and provides the contractor with the
appropriate feedback on their strengths and weaknesses
exhibited during the evaluation period.
The AFDO's decision on the amount of award fee to be
paid and on the changes in the weighted factors are not
subject to the disputes provisions of the contract.
6. PAYMENT OF THE AWARD FEE
The payment of the award fee will be made under separate
arrangement from the regular payments in the contract.
The contractor will be informed immediately after the
AFDO's decision on the amount of the award fee to be paid.
The Award Fee payment should be made within 7 working days of
receiving the contractor's invoice.
H. CHANGES
1. Change in the Basic Contract
Any change in the total amount of the basic contract
should take into consideration whether an appropriate change
should be made to the Award Fee pool.
2. Change in the Award Fee Provision
Changes in the performance factors and criteria, and
their weights, should be relayed to the contractor before the
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beginning of a new evaluation period. This will cause the
contractor to emphasize the areas which the Government found
needed improvement and reflected by the change in the
Performance factors Weight Range.
I. SUMMARY
The objective of this chapter was to provide a useful
guide that could be used by Israeli MOD personnel when
implementing the Award Fee types of contracts. The example in
Appendix A is to be used in conjunction with the information
in this chapter. The next chapter will provide the
conclusions reached during this research and recommendations
for consideration. Finally, the research questions will be
answered in summary manner.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. Use of Award Fee Types of Contracts could benefit the
Israeli Ministry of Defense
Award Fee types of contracts, FPAF and CPAF, provide
a profit incentive to contractors for increased efforts in
areas of performance which are not subject to objective
measures but are considered to be important to the successful
completion of the contract. These types of contracts can
motivate a contractor's performance in areas not possible with
the current types of contracts available to the Ministry of
Defense. It would be in the best interest of the Israeli
Government to provide the Ministry of Defense with this
additional contractual tool when considering the appropriate
contract type to meet the requirements of the IDF. These
types of contracts are used successfully in the United States
of America.
2. Award Fee Types of Contracts Motivate Contractors
Award Fee types of contracts have been used in the
United States Federal Government for approximately thirty
years. Research performed to evaluate the effectiveness of
these contract types indicates that these contracts truly
motivate contractors. Raymond G. Hunt interviewed contractors
and found that:
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Some observers believe contractors are "oriented to being
responsive in any case", but award fee provisions
nonetheless appear to enhance it. [Ref. 9: p. 84]
A summary of interview findings reflect this
conclusion:
a. Contractor Program Managers said that Award Fee
contracts attract a lot of "interest" from elsewhere in
the corporation.
b. The Award Fee type of contract creates a high rate of
formal and informal communication, both inside the
organization and between the contractor and the
Government
.
c. Feedback to contractors on performance is essentially
continuous as a result of the "good dialogue" created by
the Award Fee concept.
d. Award Fee helps programs by encouraging guality work.
3. Award Fee Types of Contracts can be used in
competitive as well as sole source methods.
The use of these types of contracts is not limited to
Sole Source negotiation. It is easily used in competitive
procedures if the solicitation includes a clause detailing the
award fee provisions and procedures to be followed in
evaluating the award fee. The United States of America
commonly awards contracts with award fee provisions after
using the competitive negotiation method.
4. The organizational structure of the Israeli Ministry
of Defense is not a barrier to the use of the Award
Fee Types of Contracts.
The organizational structure of the United States
Navy's Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair was
used as a sample because of its many similarities to the
Israeli Ministry of Defense. It was determined by this
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researcher that the Israeli MOD structure could easily mirror
the successful SUPSHIP structure that is used in the
administration of Award Fee types of contracts. The
researcher's recommended Israeli MOD structure for the
administration of Award Fee Types of Contracts can be easily
accomplished and can effectively administer these types of
contracts.
5. There are no barriers to the implementation of Award
Fee Types of Contracts that cannot be overcome.
The barriers to implementation by the Israeli Ministry
of Defense were discussed in Chapter V. These barriers were
identified through a survey sent to the Economists and Section
Heads in the Israeli DOPP and through the research of U.S.
literature on Award Fee type contracts. It was the conclusion
of this researcher that none of the barriers could not be
overcome. It would require some training, education, and most
importantly, the support of the top management within the
Israeli Ministry of Defense.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The Award Fee Types of Contracts should be
incorporated into the Israeli Ministry of Defense
procurement regulations.
The potential benefits far outweigh any disadvantages
that may arise from adoption of the Award Fee types of
contracts. These types of contracts should be used only when
the benefits to be attained are greater than the cost of
administering the contracts. The addition of these types of
81
contracts increases the choices of contractual managements
available to contracting officers. This greater flexibility
improves the contracting process and support being provided by
the Ministry of Defense.
2. When implementing the use of Award Fee Types of
Contracts, the Israeli Ministry of Defense should take
into consideration the barriers discussed in Chapter
V of this thesis.
When any change to standard procedures is contem-
plated, the concerns of the personnel charged with its
implementation must be considered and overcome in order to
assure success. The barriers to successful implementation of
the Award Fee types of contracts were discussed in Chapter V.
It was concluded by this researcher that all of the barriers
could be overcome and that the benefits to the Israeli
Government far outweigh any disadvantages.
3. The Israeli Ministry of Defense should consider
conducting a test before incorporating the Award Fee
Types of Contracts into the Ministry of Defense
regulations.
It is always a prudent practice to test a new idea or
concept before making it available for general use. In this
case, the evidence is overwhelming in favor of implementation
by the Israeli Ministry of Defense. But, even though it is a
successful type of contract in use in the United States, it
may not work in Israel. An appropriate requirement should be
chosen, the award fee contract provisions written and under-
stood, the award fee contract administration team trained, and
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1. Primary Research Question
The primary question in this thesis is: "Should the
Award Fee types of contracts be used in satisfying the
requirements for the Israeli Ministry of Defense?
The Award Fee types of contracts (CPAF and FPAF)
should be added to the existing types of contracts in the
Israeli MOD regulations. As mentioned in conclusion number
one, these types of contracts provide a profit incentive to
contractors for increased efforts in areas of performance
which are not subject to objective measures but are considered
to be important to the successful completion of the contract.
It would be in the best interest of the Israeli Government to
provide the Ministry of Defense with this additional contract
type since it motivates contractors in areas not possible with
the other types of contracts available in the MOD regulations.
2. Subsidiary Research Questions
a. What are the advantages and disadvantages
associated with the use of Award Fee types of
contracts?
Chapter III discussed in detail the advantages and
disadvantages associated with the use of the Award Fee types
of contracts. The primary advantages are:
(1) The Award Fee types of contracts motivate contractors
to perform in objective management areas selected by
the Government. This motivation is not possible when
other types of contracts are used.
(2) Award Fee types of contracts enhance communications
between the Government and the contractor. This helps
improve the contractor ' s performance and product
quality.
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(3) The Award Fee types of contracts provide the
Government with the flexibility to change the emphasis
in the evaluation criteria after each evaluation
period. This ability to essentially redirect the
contractor's focus at no additional cost is unique to
award fee contacts and is very effective.
The disadvantages associated with the use of Award Fee
types of contracts are:
(1) The costs of administering Award Fee types of
contracts is high.
(2) Award Fee types of contracts are more complicated to
administer than other types of contracts.
b. What are the differences between the acquisition
organization of the Department of Defense, as
characterized by the Navy organization and the
Israeli Ministry of Defense, with respect to
administration of Award Fee contracts?
The structural organization of a U.S. Navy
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair (SUPSHIP)
was discussed and used as a sample for the Israeli Ministry of
Defense's (MOD) structural organization. The SUPSHIP was used
because of its similarity with the Israeli Ministry of
Defense. It was concluded in Chapter IV that the Israeli MOD
structure could easily mirror the successful SUPSHIP structure
that is used in the administration of Award Fee types of
contracts. There are no significant differences between the
organizations that would prevent the use of Award Fee types of
contracts.
c. What is the best method to implement Award Fee
contracts in the Ministry of Defense?
It is recommended that the following procedure be
followed when implementing Award Fee contracts in the Ministry
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of Defense. (1) Choose an appropriate requirement to test the
Award Fee contract upon, (2) train all personnel involved with
its award and administration, (3) use the guide developed in
Chapter VI to develop the solicitation and award fee
provisions, (4) award and administer the contract, and (5)
evaluate its effectiveness.
d. Under which conditions will it be better to use
Fixed Price Award Fee type contracts versus Cost
Plus Award Fee type contracts?
The award fee provisions and award fee monitoring
procedures are the same for each type of contract. Therefore,
the decision whether to use Fixed Price Award Fee versus the
Cost Plus Award Fee type contract is dependent on the
completeness of the contract specifications and the cost risk
the contractor is willing to accept. In either case, the
award fee feature will motivate the contractor's performance
in the areas identified by the award fee criteria.
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APPENDIX A
AN EXAMPLE AWARD-FEE CONTRACT
A. INTRODUCTION
This is an example of a Fixed Price Award Fee (FPAF)
contract for the maintenance of electronic equipment.
There are two kinds of maintenance contracts:
1. Fixed Price
Normally the Fixed Price of the maintenance contract
is estimated from the value of all the equipment to be
maintained. Typically a figure from 6%-10% is used. Once the
contract is awarded, it is paid in equal monthly installments.
The contractor is obligated to perform preventive
maintenance and to repair the equipment when needed under
contract terms. The contractor can request an equitable
adjustment for repairing damages which are the result of
misuse by Government personnel
.
The main advantages of the Fixed Priced type contract
are
a. The amount of the Government's financial obligation is
clear. The contractor bears the risk for all costs
incurred to fulfill the requirements of the contract.
b. If the contractor is efficient and can reduce costs he
can earn a higher profit from the contract.
The disadvantages are:
a. It is very difficult to select a reasonable contract
price, especially when there are different types of
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equipment under the same contract, and some pieces are
older than others;
b. It is difficult for the Government to obtain information
about the cost of maintenance for use in future
contracts. Usually the contractor's accounting system
is not sufficiently detailed to provide information for
pricing future contracts.
2. Time and Materials
In this type of contract, the contractor is reimbursed
for all his costs. In most contracts, the invoices do not
distinguish between emergency maintenance and preventive
maintenance.
An advantage of a Time and Materials contract is the
ability to obtain information about specific maintenance costs
from invoices. These details can be required before approval
of payment.
Disadvantages are the risk of increased costs to
fulfill contract requirements and the lack of incentive for
the contractor to reduce cost. Reducing costs would reduce
the amount the contractor receives on this current contract
and also affect the price for future contracts.
To combine the stated advantages of the Fixed Price
contract and the Time and Materials contract, the FPAF can be
used. This combination eliminates cost risk to the Government
and provides the ability to collect information for future
contracts. The Award Fee must be large enough to motivate the
contractor to meet the objectives of the Government. The
award fee should not exceed the benefit derived from it.
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B. THE CONTRACT
This contract is for maintenance of xxxx from 01/01/19XX
to 12/31/19XX.
Type of contract: Fixed Price Award Fee.
The total contract price is: $$$
The contract price is composed of:
aaa $: Is the base contract to be paid in monthly
payments of aaa/12 a month.
bbb $: To be paid according to the Award Fee provision.
The base contract includes preventive and emergency
maintenance, as specified in Appendix B - Specifications.
1. Award Fee Provision
This provision describes the amount of the Award Fee
portion of the contract and the contractual terms for earning
the Award Fee.
The Award Fee will be given to the contractor, based
on the evaluation of the contractor's performance as defined
below.
a. Evaluation Period
The Performance Fee Board will evaluate the
contractor's performance during the evaluation period.






award 3 MA 25%
3 MA 6 MA 25%
6 MA 9 MA 25%
9 MA 12 MA 25%
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Note: "MA" means month after the award date; the specific date
of the month will be considered to be the last day of the
month
.
The performance fee will be made available to the
contractor after approval in accordance with paragraph (d) -
Performance Fee Determination and Reclama Procedures. The
Head of DIV, at his discretion, may decide to change the
weights of the criteria through use of a unilateral
modification of the contract. He also may decide to rollover
any amount that has not been approved in any of the evaluation
periods previous to the fourth period.
b. Award Review Board
The contractor's performance evaluation for each
period will be conducted by the Award Review Board (ARB)
.
This board contains no more than four members; they are:
(1) The Chairperson (Branch Head)
(2) The Section Head
(3) A Representative of Deputy for Economic Affairs (to be
determined)
(4) A Representative of the IDF Functional Branch (to be
determined)
c. Award Fee Determining Official
The Award Fee Determining Official (AFDO) , will be
the DIV's head. He shall make determinations of the award fee
to the contractor based upon the performance evaluation
conducted by the Award Review Board, established pursuant to
paragraph (b) above.
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d. Performance Fee Determination and Reclama
Procedures
(1) Within twenty (20) working days after the end of each
evaluation period under the contract, the contractor
shall furnish to the ARB such information as may be
required to help the ARB evaluate the contractor
performance during that evaluation period.
(2) Within five (5) working days after the Award Fee Board
meeting, the ARB shall prepare the performance
evaluation letter and present it to the Award Fee
Determining Official. A copy will be provided to the
contractor upon approval of the AFDO.
(3) Within five (5) working days after receipt of the copy
of the performance evaluation, the contractor may
submit to the AFDO any comments with respect thereto.
In support of his comments, the contractor may furnish
a written description of his performance during the
period under consideration. This description shall
clearly identify specific evaluation factors, criteria,
and the contractor's own rating of it.
(4) Within six (6) working days after receipt of the
contractor's comments, the AFDO shall provide the BU's
head with a final performance evaluation and
determination of the award fee.
(5) Within two (2) working days after receipt of the final
determination, the BU's head shall notify the
contractor in writing of that final determination.
(6) The contractor shall submit an invoice on the amount
determined. The award fee payment will be made within
seven (7) working days after receiving the contractor's
invoice.
e. Finality of AFDO's determination
The determination by the AFDO of the amount of the
award fee and the weight of the performance factors is final
and shall not be subject to dispute.
f . Performance Factors and Weights
The contractor's performance during each
evaluation period will be judged according to four factors:
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Performance Factor Weight Range Percent
1) Quality of Service 25%
2) Timeliness 25%
3) Management Performance 25%
4) Documentation 25%
The total weight of the performance factors in any
evaluation period will equal 100%.
The Government may, at its discretion,
unilaterally make changes in the performance factors and
criteria as well as adjustments to the weight of these
factors. Changes must be completed before commencement of the
next evaluation period and the contractor must be apprised of
these changes. Unsatisfactory performance under a performance
fee criterion may result in an increased weight for that
factor during future evaluation periods. Elements of the
performance factors are described below.
(1) Quality of service.
1-a. Effectiveness and efficiency as determined by the
selection of the appropriate level of professional
technicians for specific jobs.
1-b. Efficiency of repairs in the consumer shop.
1-c. The duration of equipment operation without break down
or substitution.
1-d. Effectiveness of periodical maintenance.
(2) Timeliness.
2-a. Speed in responding to the request for repair after
notification of equipment breakdown.




-a. Effectiveness of the management organization in
problem anticipation or problem avoidance.
3-b. Effectiveness of cost control.
(4) Documentation.
4-a. Effectiveness of cost recording procedures to provide
information about costs per type of equipment, age of
equipment, and type of repairs.
(5) Performance rating.
In evaluating Contractor performance,
numerical ratings will be used for each factor:
ADJECTIVE NUMERICAL CRITERIA
RATING RATING
EXCELLENT 90-100 The Contractor's performance
exceeds requirements by a substantial margin. The evaluator
cannot cite relevant areas for improvement.
GOOD 65-89 The Contractor's performance
exceeds total performance requirements. The evaluator may
cite one or more areas for improvement, but they are minor in
terms of potential program impact.
SATISFACTORY 40-64 The Contractor's performance
meets all requirements. The performance is neither
siqnificantly superior nor significantly inferior. Areas for
improvement are expected in performance of typical
availability of this size and complexity.
MARGINAL 21-39 The content and quality of the
contractor's performance are close to being adequate, although
there are many areas for improvement. No major deficiencies
are cited.
UNSATISFACTORY 0-2 The content and quality of the
contractor's performance in at least one area are deemed by
the evaluator to need substantial improvement. The
contractor's performance in an area being evaluated is so
deficient that potentially adverse program impact is possible.
The need for improvement is such that Government action may be
required.
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g. Computing the award fee
The total performance rate will be the sum of the
factors rated multiplied by .25. The relationship of the award
fee pool to be paid (subject to determination of the Award Fee
Determination Official) to the performance rating will be as
follows:
Performance Rating Percent of Award Fee Pool
0-20
21-100 (Rating - 20) x 100
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A performance rating of 20 or below is deemed
unsatisfactory. The contractor is not entitled to any award
fee for a rating of 20 or below.
h. Maximum Fee
In no event shall the total award fee under this
contract exceed xx% of the base contract (same ratio between







Subj . : Award Fee Type Contract - Suggestion
I am going to suggest, as my thesis, a new type of
contract - "Award Fee" that has proven to be a very effective
contractual vehicle within the United States Department of
Defense. I need your experience to help me identify problems
in applying this new type of incentive contract in our
acquisition process.
The Award Fee type contract is an incentive type, which
can be used with both fixed price and cost type contracts.
There is a separate pot of money in the contract that is
designated specifically to evaluate and reward the contractor
for their performance in specific categories chosen by the
Government for special emphasis by the contractor. The award
fee categories are in addition to the requirements outlined in
the specifications of the contract. Money is reserved for
each evaluation period and the Government representatives
determine what the contractor's performance has been for the
evaluation period. How much money the contractor receives
from the award fee pool is the sole determination of the
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Contracting Officer or Fee Determining Official based on
inputs from the people administering the contract.
The main advantages of this type of contract is the
flexibility that it provides to the government because it
allows the Government to emphasize specific areas which need
improvement or top management concern by the contractor during
the contract life. Typical areas reviewed are: cost control,
quality assurance, management and so on. Evaluation criteria
must be developed and included in the contract for each area
which is used to evaluate the contractor's performance.
The evaluation periods are agreed upon by the parties and
included in the contract. Before every evaluation period the
contractor is provided with the weights associated with each
performance factor. At the end of the evaluate period, the
evaluation board will recommend the grade to be given to the
contractor based on their evaluation of the contractor's
performance. If the contractor's performance in one or more
of the factors is less than excellent the contractor will get
less than the amount designated for the period. The decision
on the performance factors weight and on the amount of award
to be given to the contractor is a unilateral decision and is
not subject to negotiations or disputes by the contractor.
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